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Abstract
This paper analyses the link between growth and public policy when the
latter depends on economically important fundamentals. When policy is
endogenous the measured effects of policy on growth will generally be bi-
ased. Using a widely quoted theoretical model, the signs of the biases
are derived. It is shown that the usually reported effects on growth of
tax rate variables related to GDP, the ratio of public investment to total
investment and the ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP are generally
biased downwards. Based on these signed biases the paper discusses some
empirical results that seem puzzling from a theoretical viewpoint.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes empirical findings that appear to be at odds with theoretical
predictions as regards the effects of policy on growth.
In this context, almost all researchers acknowledge that their empirical work
may be riddled by endogeneity problems. This paper concentrates on exactly
these problems. More precisely, it attributes the discrepancy of results to the
fact that policy is economically endogenous and that treating it as exogenous
provides one with a misleading picture of the relationship between fiscal policy
and growth.
For instance, many authors have investigated the effects of taxation on long-
run growth. Although employing similar (theoretical) frameworks, their conclu-
sions differ widely. See, for example, King and Rebelo (1990), Lucas (1990),
Rebelo (1991), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), Pecorino (1993), (1994), or
Stokey and Rebelo (1995).
The impact of productive government spending has, for instance, been an-
alyzed by Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990) or Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1992).
According to their theoretical results productive government spending should
play a significant role in influencing the private return on capital and through
that the long-run growth rate.
The link between (re-)distribution and growth has e.g. been analyzed by
Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), or Per-
otti (1996). These studies often find that theoretically redistribution of resources
from the accumulated towards the non-accumulated factor of production should
be expected to affect growth negatively.
To test these theoretical predictions a large number of contributions has pro-
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ceeded by taking averages of their data over time and run simple cross-country
OLS regressions over these averages.1 For that reason the paper concentrates on
simple statistics based on time averages of variables, bearing in mind that simple
statistics may also be relevant for more sophisticated methods.
For instance, Koester and Kormendi (1989), Barro (1991), (1997), Levine
and Renelt (1992), Easterly and Rebelo (1993a), or Sala-i-Martin (1997) have
analyzed the effects of fiscal policy on growth. Most of them find that tax rates
or other, tax financed fiscal variables have a negative, but - when controlling for
initial income - insignificant effect on growth. That would cast doubt on Barro
(1990) or Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1992) who show that some of these variables
should have a significant and (often) positive effect.
In this paper it is assumed that public policy takes account of fundamental
economic variables that may or may not be included in growth regressions. The
assumption of endogenous policy implies that the OLS estimates of the effect
of public policy variables on growth are generally biased, implying that correct
statistical inferences would not really be possible.
Based on a simplified version of the widely quoted model of Alesina and Rodrik
(1994), theoretical correlations between public policy and fundamental economic
variables are derived to sign the biases. That, in turn, allows for interpretations
of some empirical findings that seem puzzling from a theoretical viewpoint.
The theory would predict that the estimates for the effects on growth of tax
rate variables related to the tax base are generally biased upwards and so over-
1In the paper ’simple cross-country OLS regression’ is meant to reflect that procedure of
handling the time series dimension of the data. Of course, ’simple’ does not mean simplistic,
since the availability of data may not allow for another or a ’better’ method of analysis. More
recently some authors have advocated the use of dynamic panel data methods to pay explicit
attention to the time series dimension. See e.g. Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996). But the
latter methods seem to have their own problems as e.g. argued by Barro (1997), p. 37, Temple
(1999), p. 132, and e.g. analyzed by Banerjee, Marcellino and Osbat (2000).
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estimated. Thus, any reported negative effect of taxes on growth is understated,
if measured by these variables.2
However, in the macroeconomics literature tax rates are usually measured by
variables related to GDP.3 It is shown that the estimates of the effect on growth
of tax rate variables related to GDP are generally biased downwards. Thus, any
reported negative (positive) effect of tax rates on growth would be overstated
(understated), if measured by those variables. The systematic underestimation
implies that the theoretical prediction that high tax rates negatively affect growth
may be inherently untestable. Hence, it matters what variables one uses for tax
rates in growth regressions.
If public policy is assumed to be exogenous, the estimated coefficients of the
effect on growth of the ratio of productive public expenditure to total investment
or to GDP are biased downwards under all polices considered. If public policy
is assumed to be endogenous, the point estimates of the effect on growth of the
ratio of public investment to total investment are biased downwards.
That has interesting implications for any hypothesis that claims that the
breakdown of total investment between public and private investment does not
materially affect growth. It also casts doubt on the hypothesis that a typical
country comes close to the quantity of public investment that maximizes growth.
Under the assumption of endogenous policy, the estimated coefficients of the
effect on growth of the ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP are generically
biased downwards. That renders the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for
growth untestable for the following reason: The prediction of the theoretical
2Effect is not meant to be causal. In this paper effect means that some underlying economic
fundamental influences policy which in turn bears on growth. Then the ’true’ effect of policy
on growth is spurious really, but can be picked up by simple linear operationalizations of the
model.
3Common variables are ’the ratio of tax revenues to GDP’ for average tax rates, or ’the ratio
of the change in tax revenues to the change in GDP’ for marginal tax rates.
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model is that redistributive transfers are bad for growth. However, in the model
an increase in efficiency makes an optimizing, redistributing government grant
less transfers to the non-accumulated factor of production. This last effect is
ignored in cross-country growth regressions when one assumes that public policy
is exogenous.
For theoretical reasons many researchers expect a negative coefficient for the
effect of redistributive transfers on growth. However, many people find positive
coefficients (for example, for the effect of social security contributions on growth,
see Sala-i-Martin (1996)). As any downward bias of the estimated coefficients
may be as large as minus infinity, a reported negative coefficient cannot corrob-
orate the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for growth. On the other hand,
any downward bias is perfectly consistent with many empirical findings and the
alternative hypothesis that redistribution is not bad for growth.
The main insight of the paper’s analysis is that the disentanglement of the
interplay of economic fundamentals and policy one the one hand and policy and
growth on the other is difficult and should provide an interesting area for further
research.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model and
analyzes endogenous policy. The next section uses theoretical correlations derived
from the model to analyze the effect of tax, public investment and redistributive
transfer variables on growth. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 Theory
Consider a private ownership economy that is populated by two types of price-
taking, infinitely lived individuals who are all equally patient. One group of
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agents, the capitalists (k), owns wealth equally and does not work. The other
group of agents, the workers (W ), owns (raw) labour equally, but no capital.4
Population is stationary and each group of agents derives logarithmic utility
from the consumption of a homogeneous, malleable good. Aggregate output is
produced according to
Yt = AK
α
t G
1−α
t L
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1 (1)
where Yt denotes aggregate output, Kt is the real capital stock, Lt is labour
supplied, and Gt are public inputs to production. See Barro (1990). Capital is
broadly defined and includes human capital.5 The index A reflects the economy’s
state of technology. It depends on cultural, institutional and technological devel-
opment and captures long-run exogenous factors that play a role in the production
process. Labour is inelastically supplied and normalized so that the total labour
endowment equals unity, Lt = 1. The model abstracts from the depreciation of
capital so that output and factor returns are really defined in net terms.
The government taxes wealth at the constant rate τ , redistributes a con-
stant share λ of its tax revenues to the workers6 and runs a balanced budget:
τKt = Gt+λτKt. The LHS depicts the tax revenues and the RHS public expen-
ditures. The workers receive λτKt as transfers and Gt is spent on public inputs
to production.
4The assumption may be justified by various arguments, especially for the long run. See
e.g. Kaldor (1956), Pasinetti (1962), Schlicht (1975), Bourguignon (1981), or Bertola (1993).
5This eliminates a separate treatment of how human capital is accumulated. By assumption
the economies are perfectly competitive and the return on human capital services equals that
of physical capital services.
6Following Alesina and Rodrik (1994) the wealth tax scheme represents a broad class of
distributive tax arrangements, which distort the investors’ incentive to accumulate. These
authors show that the optimal policies are constant over time and, thus, time-consistent. For
convenience constancy of policy is assumed from the beginning in this paper.
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There are many identical, profit-maximizing firms which operate in a perfectly
competitive environment. They are owned by the capital owners who rent capital
to and demand shares of the firms. The shares are collateralized one-to-one by
capital. The markets for assets and capital are assumed to clear at each point in
time. The firms take Gt as given and rent capital and labour in spot markets in
each period. The price of output yt serves as nume´raire and is set it equal to one.
Profit maximization entails that firms pay each factor of production its marginal
product,
r = αA[(1− λ)τ ]1−α (2)
wt ≡ η(τ, λ)Kt = (1− α)A[(1− λ)τ ]1−αKt. (3)
Because of the productive role of government services policy has a bearing
on the marginal products. The return on capital is constant over time while the
wages grow with the capital stock. Notice that more redistribution lowers r and
η, while higher taxes raise them.
The workers derive utility from consuming their entire income. They do not
invest and are not taxed. Their intertemporal welfare is given by
∫ ∞
0
lnCWt e
−ρtdt where CWt = η(τ, λ)Kt + λτKt. (4)
The capitalists choose how much to consume or invest, and they have perfect
foresight about the prices and tax rates, which they take as given. They maximize
6
their intertemporal utility according to
max
Ckt
∫ ∞
0
lnCkt e
−ρtdt (5)
s.t. K˙t = (r − τ)Kt − Ckt (6)
K(0) = K0, K(∞) = free, (7)
where equation (6) is the capitalists’ dynamic budget constraint which depends
on their after-tax income (r − τ)Kt. In Appendix A it is shown that their con-
sumption and wealth optimally grow at
γ ≡ C˙
k
t
Ckt
=
K˙t
Kt
= (r − τ)− ρ (8)
which is increasing in the after-tax return on capital and constant over time.
Equilibrium. In steady state the economy is characterized by balanced growth
at the rate γ, which is first increasing and then decreasing in τ for given λ.
Growth is maxmized when τ = [α(1−α)A] 1α ≡ τˆ and λ = 0. If taxes higher than
τˆ are levied, growth is traded off against redistribution when λ > 0 and τˇ > τˆ .
Furthermore, r − τ = τ (αA[(1− λ)τ ]−α − 1) so that for given policy an in-
crease in efficiency A or in the share of capital α raises growth.
Policy. The intertemporal welfare of an entirely pro-capital, V r, resp. entirely
pro-labour government, V l, is given by
V r(Ckt ) =
ln(ρK0)
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
and V l(CWt ) =
ln [(η(τ, λ) + λτ)K0]
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
. (9)
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See Appendix B. The governments respect the right of private property and
maximize the welfare of their clientele under the condition λ ≥ 0.
The optimal pro-labour policy is derived in Appendix C and is given by
If ρ ≥ [(1− α)A] 1α then:
τ = ρ, λ = 1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
ρ
. (10)
If ρ < [(1− α)A] 1α then:
τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] = ρ(1− α), λ = 0 . (11)
Denote the optimal pro-labour tax rate by τˇ and notice that for a wide range
of parameter values there is no redistribution. In particular, if the agents are suffi-
ciently patient or the economy is very efficient, the owners of the non-accumulated
factor of production (workers) prefer to have higher growth instead of direct re-
distribution. This is because high growth may be better for their income stream
and so long-run welfare than direct (unproductive) transfers. In that way the
model distinguishes between redistributing and non-redistributing (pro-labour)
governments.
In contrast, the pro-capital government chooses τ = τˆ , does not redistribute
and acts growth maximizing in this model by granting the maximum after-tax
return on capital to the capital owners.
All optimal policies depend on A, α, and ρ. Thus, policy is endogenous in the
paper. The rate of time preference will not be considered any further because it
is mostly considered a soft variable, which is very hard to measure. For the other
variables I find the following
8
Table 1: Growth and Policy Effects
PC PLλ=0 PLλ≥0
τˆ γˆ τˇ γˇ τˇ λ γˇ
A + + + + 0 - +
α ? + ? + 0 ? +
PC - pro-capital, PL - pro-labour
Sign: (+) - positive, (−) - negative, (?) - ambiguous
See Appendix D. Thus, an increase in efficiency raises growth, does not imply
lower tax rates but calls for lower redistribution under all policies considered.
This is due to the externality of public inputs. Higher growth requires more tax
revenues for productive services channelled into production in order to raise the
return on capital and so growth.
In turn, a higher share of capital also raises growth under all policies, but
that effect is ambiguous as regards taxes and redistribution. This is interesting
because it means that shifting relatively more factor income towards capital may
call for higher or lower taxes in order to generate a higher after-tax income for
capital and higher growth. For instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), ftn. 7, cite
theoretical support for the prediction that an increase in α raises redistributive
pressure leading to higher taxes. Thus, higher taxes may even be optimal for
a government that is only concerned about the welfare of the owners of the
accumulated factor of production.
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3 Growth Empirics
According to the theory the empirical, long-run relationship between growth and
policy for a country i is of the form
γi = f(τi(αi, Ai), λi(αi, Ai), αi, Ai) = f(αi, Ai) (12)
where f(·) is a non-linear function of αi and Ai which are assumed to be country-
specific, that is, independent and thus uncorrelated across countries.7
An analysis of exogenous, once-and-for-all changes in Ai is similar in spirit to
models with exogenous technological change, which is commonly thought to be
unobservable.8 Clearly, countries differ widely in the level of development, but
reliable data and concepts capturing the essence of development are not readily
available. Thus, Ai is taken to be unobservable, implying that information on Ai
would be contained in the disturbance term and would not feature separately in
the regressions. Then the second-best, but operationally viable model would be
γi = β0 + β1αi + β2τi(αi, Ai) + β3λi(αi, Ai) + vi (13)
where vi = vi(Ai, i) is a country-specific disturbance term which depends on Ai
and i. The latter is assumed to be uncorrelated with Ai as well as with each of
the regressors, and E(i) = 0.
7Under the assumption of exogenous policy γi = g(τi, λi, αi, Ai) where τi and λi are inde-
pendent of the other variables included in g(·). Notice that f(·) and g(·) may be observationally
equivalent when particular combinations of αi and Ai lead to the same growth rate under either
assumption. Thus, assume that empirical and theoretical researchers agree that the Data Gen-
erating Mechanism (DGP) is given by the joint probability distribution D(γ, τ, λ, α,A), which
is expressed in terms of steady state variables and, thus, ignores any time dependence. That
reflects the procedure to take time-averages of data which are considered of interest.
8The discussion about the Solow-Residual reflects these difficulties. See, for instance, Barro
and Sala–i–Martin (1995), chpt. 10.4.
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If that model were estimated by OLS, multicollinearity and the omission of
a relevant variable would be a problem. As the error term correlates with the
regressors or any transformation thereof depending on α or A, the conditions of
weak exogeneity in the sense of Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) are violated.9
A standard justification for treating policy as exogenous is a randomization
argument. For example, Barro (1989a) argues that in a large sample public
policies may be treated as randomly generated. That comes close to saying that
policies are exogenous. But in light of this paper’s analysis the argument would
not hold. Even if all countries had different governments with different welfare
functions so that polices looked randomly chosen, the model predicts that all
policies would be influenced by fundamental economic variables included or not
included in the regressions. The paper concentrates on exactly that problem.
Taxes. Most studies investigating the relation between taxes and growth use
av1 =
TAR
TAB
, m1 =
dTAR
dTAB
, av2 =
TAR
GDP
, m2 =
dTAR
dGDP
as regressor variables where TAR denotes the total tax revenues in a country,
and TAB denotes the tax base. Usually, av1 and av2 represent average tax rates,
whereas m1 and m2 are often used as proxies for marginal tax rates.
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From the model τ is equal to both av1 and m1, which are related to the
tax base.11 Suppose γi = δ
1
0 + δ
1
1τi + u
1
i is run and it is assumed that policy is
9Thus, reported t−statistics will not report the true significance levels and statistical infer-
ences are not really possible. However, here the focus is on the problem caused by assuming
that policy is exogenous.
10All these variables are problematic representations for aggregate relationships between fiscal
policy and growth. For instance, the ’marginal tax rate’m2 is commonly obtained by regressing
tax revenues on GDP, where the resulting regression coefficient is interpreted as the ’marginal
tax rate’. See, for instance, Koester and Kormendi (1989) or Easterly and Rebelo (1993b).
That raises the question whether GDP really is the relevant tax base.
11The equality appears problematic as one would often expect that marginal tax rates (m) are
11
exogenous. In that case the OLS estimator of δ11, call it d
1
1, would be unbiased.
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However, assuming that policy is exogenous when in fact it is endogenous yields
biased estimates, because d11 =
∑
i(τi−τ¯)γi∑
i(τi−τ¯)2 and substituting in the ’true’ model
(13) yields d11 = β2 + β1
∑
i ciαi + β3
∑
i ciλi +
∑
i civi where ci =
(τi−τ¯)∑
i(τi−τ¯)2 and
vi = vi(Ai, i). Taking expectations under the assumption that policy is in fact
endogenous one obtains13
E(d11) = β2 + β1E
[∑
i
ciαi
]
+ β3E
[∑
i
ciλi
]
+ E
[∑
i
civi
]
.
Hence, d11 is generally biased because the sum of the expectations of the expres-
sions on the RHS is non-zero.
The bias is due to three factors. First, the expression
∑
i civi is positive
for all non-redistributing governments since cov(τi, Ai) > 0 from Table 1. Sec-
ond, cov(τi, λi) ≥ 0, which is positive if governments redistribute. Third, if
cov(τi, αi) ≥ 0, the bias is clearly positive.
Proposition 1 Let av1 or m1 have the same properties as τ . Simple cross-
country OLS regressions of the growth rate on τ , av1 or m1 assuming that policy
is exogenous, when in fact it is endogenous, yields generically biased estimates.
In many cases and definitely if cov(τ, α) ≥ 0, the bias would be positive.
Thus, the coefficients measuring the effect of these variables on growth are
overestimated so that either any reported negative effect is understated or any
not lower and often higher than average tax rates (av). One should bear in mind, however, that
for economies with flat-rate tax systems, which are often analyzed and sometimes advocated
to be adopted in the theoretical literature, av = m would certainly hold. Thus, a discussion of
the effect of such tax variables on growth in simple OLS cross-country growth regressions may
be worth for that and for theoretical reasons.
12The superscript 1 indicates that the regression is run on variables related to the tax base.
13Under exogenous policy the expectation would be conditional on (τi, λi, Ai, αi), since all
researchers agree on the ’true’ DGP by assumption. Under endogenous policy the expectation
is only conditional on (Ai, αi), of course.
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reported positive effect is overstated. In the theoretical literature higher taxes
are usually shown to affect growth negatively. Hence, if one found a negative
effect for regressors like τ , av1 or m1 one could be ’sure’ that the effect is indeed
negative. Even a reported positive effect would not invalidate the prediction
that the ’true’ effect is really negative. Hence, Proposition 1 provides a negative
result for hypothesis testing, but it offers an important ’positive’ link to empirical
research in that it provides an argument that any theoretically derived negative
relationship between taxes and growth is ’true’, if the regressors are τ , av1 or m1
and have the theoretical model’s properties.
However, Proposition 1 rests on strong assumptions. The determination of a
country’s tax base most relvant for growth is extremely difficult. Usually govern-
ments raise all sorts of taxes on different tax bases. Furthermore, countries do
not necessarily use the same tax bases and for some tax bases data are difficult
to obtain. For that reason the vast majority of cross-country growth studies use
av2 or m2 as regressors.
But the choice of regressors may affect the underlying structure of the es-
timated and the statistical model. Going from τ or av2 to m2 often entails a
non-linear reparametrization of an original estimated model or a different model
altogether.14 For instance, the choice of av2 as a regressor variable means that
γ = f 2( τKt
Yt
, αi, Ai, ρi) = f
2(αi, Ai, ρi) which is usually not the same as f(·) in
(12). Instead of trying to find a reparametrization of the original model assume
all policy variables react to the fundamental variables as in Table 1 and f 2(av2, ·)
can be linearized as γi = β
2
0 + β
2
1αi + β
2
2 av2i + v
2
i (Ai, i). The same assumptions
14It should be borne in mind that the theoretical model is supposed to capture essential
properties of the relation between taxes and growth. Thus, it is perfectly valid and common
scientific procedure to reduce a problem to a simple model and use some, but not necessarily
the closest estimable and statistical models to test the theoretical predictions. On this point
see, for instance, Spanos (1986), chpts. 1.2 and 26.
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and arguments apply for m2 and f
2(m2, ·).
From the theoretical model it is not difficult to verify that15
av2 ≡ τKt
Yt
=
τα
A(1− λ)1−α and m2 ≡
d(τKt)
dYt
=
av2
1− α. (14)
Thus, m2 > av2 which is a property most researcher would expect. For instance,
Koester and Kormendi (1989), p. 370/1, find that marginal tax rates m2 are sig-
nificantly different from average tax rates av2 and that ’across countries marginal
tax rates average about one-and-one-half to two times average tax rates’.
Notice that even under the assumption of exogenous policy the coefficients on
av2 and m2 would be biased downwards. If policy is endogenous, then av2(τˆ) =
α(1− α), m2(τˆ) = α and so dav2(τˆ)dA = dm2(τˆ)dA = 0. For non-redistributing policies
dav2
dA
= τ
α
A2
[
αA
τ
dτ
dA
− 1] and dm2
dA
=
(
1
1−α
)
dav2
dA
. Furthermore, αA
τ
dτ
dA
< 1 if
α2(1− α)A (τα − α(1− α)2A)−1 < 1
α(1− α)2A+ α2(1− α)A < τα
τˆ < τ
(15)
which is true for τˇ > τˆ . Thus, dav2(τˇ)
dA
and dm2(τˇ)
dA
are negative. For a redistributing
government av2 =
ρ
A[(1−α)A] 1−αα
which decreases in A. By a similar argument
one verifies that m2 decreases in A under that policy. Hence, cov(av2i, Ai) and
cov(m2i, Ai) are non-positive.
To keep matters simple assume that the covariance of av2i (m2i) and αi is
non-positive.16 Then av2 co-varies with A or α in the same way as m2 does.
15Recall Yt = AKαt G
1−α
t and Gt = (1 − λ)τkt. Then av2 = τKtYt = τKtAKαt ((1−λ)τKt)1−α which
reduces to the expression in (14). Furthermore, dYtd(τKt) = (1 − α)AKαt (1 − λ)1−α(τKt)−α.
Taking the inverse yields dτKtdYt =
τα
(1−α)A(1−λ)1−α =
av2
1−α .
16For instance, for given tax policies of all non-redistributing governments an increase in α
14
Suppose one assumes exogenous policy, although it is not, and runs the re-
gression γi = δ
2
0 + δ
2
1 av2i+ u
2
i where the superscript 2 indicates that model f
2(·)
is being analyzed. Proceeding as above reveals that d21 is generically biased down-
wards, that is, it is biased down unless all governments act growth maximizing
and cov(av2i, αi) = 0. Hence, any measured negative effect of av2 on γ may often
be overstated. Similar arguments hold for m2.
Proposition 2 Assume policy variables react to fundamental economic variables
as in Table 1, the DGPs for f(·) and f 2(·) are the same, and cov(av2i, αi) and
cov(m2i, αi) are non-positive. A simple cross-country OLS regression of γ on av2
or m2 yields generically biased estimates. Unless all governments in the sample
pursue growth maximizing polices, the estimates are biased downwards.
The downward bias may be explained as follows: Tax rates higher than the
growth maximizing ones lead to relatively lower growth. That explains why many
authors find a negative point estimate for δ21. For instance, Koester and Kormendi
(1989) report d11 = −0.074 (−2.18) for a simple regression of growth on average
tax rates.17 (All t-statistics are shown in parentheses.) However, in the model
the bad direct effect of high taxes is compensated by the good effect of taxes
channelled into production via public services. That good effect is larger when
A is higher and it is ignored when assuming that policy is exogenous.
For instance, Levine and Renelt (1992), Engen and Skinner (1992), or Sala-i-
Martin (1997) find that controlling for initial income y0 renders their estimated
effects of taxes on growth insignificant. However, putting initial income in the
regression first and then adding a tax variable often renders the estimated coeffi-
reduces av2. Thus, the results below are conditional on that or that cov(av2i, Ai) (cov(m2i, Ai))
is more important than cov(av2i, αi) (cov(m2i, αi)). The condition is testable and any results
derived from it are therefore falsifiable.
17The reported coefficient on m2 was −0.025(−1.87).
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cient of the effect of initial income on growth insignificant. For instance, Easterly
and Rebelo (1993a) find in their growth regressions that seven(!) out of thirteen
tax variables render the estimated coefficients for the effect of initial income on
growth insignificant. This possibility is often ignored, although it provides a
rationale for not including either tax measures or initial income in growth regres-
sions. Thus, from a statistical viewpoint alone there is no reason why authors
such Levine and Renelt (1992) or Sala-i-Martin (1997) conclude that fiscal vari-
ables are mostly non-robust regressors when fiscal variables are highly correlated
with initial income.
A downward bias of d21 plays an important role in explaining why one is likely
to obtain insignificant coefficients in a regression γi = ξ
2
0 + ξ
2
1av2i ++ξ
2
2y0i + w
2
i .
Elementary econometrics tells one that the OLS estimator of ξ21 is given by
ξˆ21 =
d21 − ξˆ213 ξˆ232
1− ξˆ223 ξˆ232
where d21 reflects the slope of the simple regression of γi on av2, ξˆ
2
13 the slope of
the regression of γi on y0i, ξˆ223 the slope of the regression of av2 on y0i and ξˆ
2
32
the slope of the regression of y0i on av2. E.g., Koester and Kormendi report
d21 = −0.074 (−2.18) , ξˆ213 = −0.053 (−3.52),
ξˆ223 = +0.293 (+6.32) , ξˆ
2
1 = −0.005 (−0.11),
from which the imputed value of ξˆ232 is 1.3389. It is instructive to see that includ-
ing initial income reduces the point estimate for the effect of taxes on growth (d21
vs. ξˆ21) by a factor of 14.8 and makes it statistically insignificant.
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18Notice that taxes and initial income are positively and comparatively strongly correlated
(ξˆ223), indicating that Wagner’s Law holds which asserts a positive relation between the size
of the government and per capita income. Furthermore, initial income is negatively related to
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Suppose ξˆ213, ξˆ
2
23 and ξˆ
2
32 were unbiased estimates. By Proposition 2 any nega-
tive value of d21 is overstated so that the true δ
2
1 would be less negative than the
value reported. If one fixes the other estimates one gets
ξˆ21 =
d21 − (−0.053) (+1.3389)
1− (+0.293) (+1.3389) = (d
2
1 + 0.0710)× 1.6455.
Underestimation means that a negative estimate d21 would overstate any true
(negative) δ21, which raises the problem of how big the bias is. Suppose δ
2
1 = d
2
1×x
where x ∈ (−∞, 1) and that the unknown ’true’ value is non-positive, δ21 ≤ 0.
Table 2: Bias Effects on ξˆ21 when d
2
1 = −0.074
x 0.99 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.80 0.5 0.10
ξˆ21 −0.004 +0.001 +0.007 +0.013 +0.019 +0.056 +0.104
Thus, a five-percent bias in d21 raises ξˆ
2
1 from −0.005 to +0.001, that is, it
pushes the point estimate of ξˆ21 towards zero. That is interesting, because many
researchers control for initial income first and then add policy variables to their
growth regressions. Most of them find that variables such as av2 take on values
close to zero. Given the bias in d21 the ’true’ point estimate of ξˆ
2
1 is likely to
be positive and maybe statistically significant. Most authors argue that they
find insignificant effects for variables such as av2 because of the high correlation
between initial income and av2, that is, high ξˆ
2
23 or ξˆ
2
32.
However, a ξˆ21 which is close to zero may mean that the ’true’ ξ
2
1 is positive
and that biases in d21 push ξˆ
2
1 down towards zero. Hence, one cannot exclude
the possibility that a higher ’ratio of tax revenues to GDP’ may actually have a
positive effect on growth.
By the same token one cannot exclude the possibility that marginal tax rates,
growth, which is often interpreted as indicating conditional convergence in the growth process,
that is, countries with lower initial income tend to have higher subsequent growth.
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measured by m2, positively affect growth. For example, Perotti (1996) is puzzled
to find positive and significant coefficients for the effect of marginal tax rates on
growth in his 2SLS regressions.
A negative bias in the coefficients for av2 or m2 implies that the theoretical
prediction that higher taxes negatively affect growth is inherently untestable.
Any reported value of the effect of tax variables such as av2 or m2 on growth
is always underestimated, that is, a reported negative effect would be overstated
and a reported positive effect would be understated. As a reported negative
effect may well be positive in ’reality’ then, the theoretical prediction cannot be
corroborated when using av2 or m2 and the paper’s theoretical model captures
general properties of the effect of taxes and policy on growth.
Hence, it matters a great deal which tax variables one includes in growth
regressions.
Public Investment. Sometimes growth is regressed on the ratio of government
investment to GDP or total (private and public) investment to test how public
investment such as changes in infrastructure affect growth. Theoretically, a sig-
nificant and often positive relationship is expected. See, for instance, Aschauer
(1989), Barro (1990), Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1992), or Barro and Sala–i–
Martin (1995), chpt. 4.4. Surprisingly, in many empirical studies such as Barro
(1989b), (1991), or Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995) chpt. 12.3 the effect of these
variables on growth turns out to be statistically insignificant.
In this paper long-run total investment is given by It = γKt,
p ≡ Gt
Yt
=
1
A
(
Gt
Kt
)α
=
((1− λ)τ)α
A
and q ≡ Gt
γKt
=
(1− λ)τ
γ
. (16)
Barro (1991) uses public expenditure data to test his theoretical predictions
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which are based on Gt arguing that it is a proxy for the change in the stock of
public capital. That is a problematic assumption, possible implications of which
he discusses. For consistency with empirical results, which are often based on
that, assume that Gt is indeed a good proxy for public investment, that is, a proxy
for the change in the stock of public capital for which data are difficult to obtain.
Furthermore, in line with the previous discussion on taxes and for simplicity
assume that the correlation between these ratios and αi is less important than
that between the ratios and Ai. Thus, all results below are conditional on that
assumption.
Interestingly, for given tax policies both p and q are decreasing in A or α.
Thus, the coefficients measuring the effect of these variables on growth would be
biased downwards even under the assumption of exogenous policy.
For endogenous policy the ratio of public investment to total investment (q)
is discussed first. To this end let b ≡ (1 − λ)τ . Then db
dA
= − dλ
dA
τ + dτ
dA
(1 − λ)
which is positive for all policies considered. I want to show that dq
dA
< 0.
sgn
(
dq
dA
)
=
db
dA
γ − dγ
dA
b =
db
dA
(r − τ − ρ)−
(
dr
dA
− dτ
dA
)
b = q1 + q2
where q1 ≡
(
db
dA
r − dr
dA
b
)
and q2 ≡ dbdA (−τ − ρ) + dτdA b. Clearly q2 < 0, since
q2 =
(
− dλ
dA
τ +
dτ
dA
(1− λ)
)
(−τ − ρ) + dτ
dA
(1− λ)τ
=
dλ
dA
τ(τ + ρ)− dτ
dA
(1− λ)ρ < 0
with dλ
dA
≤ 0 and dτ
dA
≥ 0 and at least one of the derivatives being non-zero for all
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policies considered. For q1 one obtains
q1 =
db
dA
r − (rA + rb dbdA) b = (r − rb b) dbdA − rA b
= α2Ab1−α db
dA
− rA b = αb1−α
[
αA
db
dA
− b
]
which is non-positive for all non-redistributing policies since for λ = 0 one gets
αA dτ
dA
≤ τ as has been shown in (15). For a redistributing government b =
[(1− α)A] 1α and db
dA
= b
αA
so that q1 = 0. Hence, q1 + q2 < 0 and so
dq
dA
< 0.
The ratio of government investment to GDP is p = b
α
A
so that
sgn
(
dp
dA
)
= αAbα−1
db
dA
− bα = bα
[
db
dA
αA
b
− 1
]
which is zero for growth maximizing and redistributing policies. For non-redistributing
policies it is negative.
Proposition 3 Assume policy variables react to fundamental economic variables
as in Table 1, the DGP is the same as that for f(·) and γ is regressed on q or p.
If cov(qi, αi) and cov(pi, αi) are non-positive, then in simple cross-country OLS
regressions
1. the estimated coefficients measuring the effect of q on growth are biased
downwards under all policies considered.
2. the estimated coefficients measuring the effect of p on growth are biased
downwards if all governments pursue non-redistributing, pro-labour policies.
The estimated coefficients may be unbiased if all governments pursue growth
maximizing, or redistributing policies and pi is uncorrelated with αi.
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Barro (1991), Table IV, reports that the estimated coefficient for q was 0.014 (0.636)
and that for p was 0.13 (1.3) for regressions that included many variables. When
also including the significantly positive variable i/y the estimated coefficient for
p became negative and was −0.015 (−0.126).
Barro (1990), p. S124, interprets the estimated coefficient for q as corrobo-
ration of his hypothesis that ’the typical country comes close to the quantity of
public investment that maximizes the growth rate.’ As violations of the standard
assumptions for hypothesis testing make such an argument invalid, Proposition
3 provides one reason why such a hypothesis may rest on shaky ground. As any
measured positive point estimate of the effect of q on growth may be underesti-
mated, it is likely that the ratio of public to total investment positively affects
growth, even if all governments pursue growth maximizing policies.
For a sample with heterogeneous policies and a ’true’ estimate that is likely to
be significantly positive, a hypothesis compatible with the proposition should be
that, given everything else, a typical country that increases public investment is
likely to increase the growth rate, no matter what policy is pursued.19 Given the
downward biases for the measured effects of q on growth one is led to conclude
that an increase in q raises growth.
Barro interprets the statistically insignificant, but negative coefficient on p,
when the variable i/y is controlled for, as an indication that ’there is no separate
effect on growth from the breakdown of total investment between private and pub-
lic components’. That suggests the hypothesis that an optimizing public sector
invests according to the same criteria as the private sector does. For instance,
the public sector may wish to maximize the social return on its investment, just
19Notice that a significantly positive coefficient does not entail that it should be growth
maximizing to push q up to 1 when tax base or collection constraints curtail such choices.
Those and other provisos are meant by ’given everything else’.
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as private sector investors wish to maximize the private return on their invest-
ments. Barro implicitly assumes that maximization of the social return on public
investment also maximizes the growth rate.
First of all, it is worth noting that under the assumption of exogenous pol-
icy the estimated coefficients for the effect of p on growth are biased downwards,
which suggests that the ’true’ effect of public investment may be significantly posi-
tive. Under the assumption of endogenous policy the estimated coefficients for the
effect of p would be biased downwards if the sample contained non-redistributing,
pro-labour governments.
Secondly, under the assumption of endogenous policy the negative point es-
timate suggests that the breakdown matters. A reported value of −0.015 for
the effect of p on growth means that holding total investment constant and rais-
ing public investment with a compensating cut in private investment reduces
growth. Thus, a negative point estimate in that regression implies that a typical
country’s policy which crowds out private (steady state) investment is bad for
growth. That implication may be a valid result (unbiased estimates) for samples
where, according to Proposition 3, all countries are led by growth maximizing,
or redistributing, pro-labour policies and cov(p, αi) = 0. But given unbiasedness
and statistical insignificance, it follows that other than growth maximizing poli-
cies would also lead to no crowding out of public and private investment. That,
in turn, implies that a statistically insignificant value does not mean that gov-
ernments have maximized the social return on public investment. Thus, other
welfare objectives are compatible with an insignificant coefficient.
Barro views his empirical results as ’ongoing research’ and is aware of the
econometric problems mentioned above. However, he does not investigate the
implications of endogenous policy. Here it follows that under endogenous policy
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the estimated coefficients for the effect on growth of the ratio of public investment
to total investment are generally biased downwards. The estimated coefficients
for the effect on growth of the ratio of public investment to GDP may be unbi-
ased if that ratio is uncorrelated with the share of capital and other than non-
redistributing, pro-labour policies are pursued. Otherwise, there is a downward
bias in the estimated coefficients.
Interestingly, if one assumes exogenous policy, the coefficients measuring the
effect of that variable on growth are definitely biased downwards. Hence, reported
insignificant negative point estimates for that coefficient in simple cross-country
OLS regressions may be either biased downwards and so the ’true’ coefficient may
really be significantly positive or they are unbiased, but provide no corroboration
of the hypothesis that all countries are lead by growth maximizing policies.
Redistributive Transfers. Some researchers test the effect of redistributive
transfers such as social benefits, social security contributions etc. on growth.
Transfers of that kind are political instruments to correct for socially unwanted
pre-tax income inequality. In that context growth is often regressed on the ratio
of redistributive transfers to GDP, which - in this model - is given by20
b ≡ λτKt
Yt
=
λτKt
AKαt G
1−α
t
=
τKt
(
Gt
Kt
)α
AGt
=
λ ((1− λ)τ)α
A(1− λ)
where τ = ρ from (10), Gt = (1 − λ)τKt and by assumption some governments
in the sample choose λ > 0 so that data on redistribution are actually available.
Then a regression of γ on b produces biased estimates for the following reasoning:
Firstly, for given policy and cov(bi, αi) ≤ 0, the estimated effect of b on
20Table 1 implies that a regression of the growth rate on the ratio of transfers to tax revenues,
that is, λ would also yield coefficients that are biased downwards.
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growth are biased downwards. Secondly, under the assumption of endogenous
policy Table 1 implies that db
dα
and so cov(bi, αi) are ambiguous in sign. Then
db
dA
= bλ
dλ
dA
+λA < 0 since λA < 0, bλ > 0,
dλ
dA
< 0 and τ = ρ which is independent
of A, suggesting that simple OLS estimates for the effect of bi on γi are biased
downwards, that is, if cov(bi, αi) ≤ 0 in the sample or the covariance is less
important than that of cov(bi, Ai) the estimated effect of transfers on growth are
biased downwards.
Proposition 4 If cov(bi, αi) ≤ 0 and some countries in the sample are led by
redistributing governments the model predicts that in simple cross-country OLS
regressions the estimates measuring the effect on growth of the ratio of redistribu-
tive transfers to GDP are biased downwards.
Hence, any reported bad effect of redistributive transfers is overstated and
any reported good effect is understated. The downward bias would even be
present if one assumed that policy is exogenous. Many theoretical models show
that redistributive transfers are bad for growth. The reason for overstating any
measured negative effect of redistributive transfers on growth in this model is due
to the prediction that countries with more efficient economies and redistributing
governments choose to redistribute less resources per units of taxes collected.
As Proposition 4 does not say anything on the magnitude of the bias, the
latter may be as large as minus infinity. That means, the hypothesis that re-
distributive transfers are bad for growth cannot be validated by any reported
negative coefficient on transfers in simple OLS growth regressions. Thus, for sim-
ple OLS growth regressions Proposition 4 would render the hypothesis generically
untestable.
In fact, these arguments suggest the opposite hypothesis, namely that redis-
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tributive transfers affect growth in a positive way. For instance, Perotti (1994)
is surprised to find a significantly positive coefficient on redistributive transfers
in his regressions of investment on policy variables. He quotes other studies
that have found a positive relation between transfers and growth. (See ftn. 8
of his paper.) Sala-i-Martin (1996) states that it is surprising that among the
three components of public spending - public investment, public consumption
and public transfers - the only one that seems to be positively related to growth
is the redistributive transfer variable. For instance, social security contributions
are often found to affect growth in a positive way.
In that sense Proposition 4 explains why one may get positive coefficients on
redistributive transfer variables in simple OLS cross-country growth regressions
under the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for growth. Of course, the propo-
sition is perfectly compatible with the hypothesis that redistributive transfers
positively affect growth.
4 Conclusion
Within a common theoretical framework it is shown how optimizing governments
take account of fundamental economic variables when making their decisions so
that public policy is economically endogenous and has interesting effects on long-
run growth. Several findings of the paper are noteworthy.
First, under certain conditions the policies optimal for the accumulated factor
of production (growth maximization) may also be pursued if a government has
other welfare objectives. An increase in technological efficiency generally raises
optimal taxes and growth under the policies considered.
Second, when policy is endogenous the estimated coefficients on policy vari-
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ables are generically biased. The direction of the biases are deduced from the
theoretical model, providing some explanations for certain, sometimes puzzling
point estimates found in the empirical literature.
Third, it is shown that the effects on growth of some widely used variables
such as tax rate variables related to GDP, the ratio of public investment to total
investment and the ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP are generally biased
downwards.
For instance, for the latter this implies the following: Under the assumption
that policy is economically endogenous, the effect of redistributive transfer vari-
ables on growth are generally underestimated so that the hypothesis that redis-
tribution is bad for growth may not be testable. The downward bias is, however,
perfectly consistent with empirical findings in the literature which find a positive
association between redistributive transfers and growth. It may also represent
corroboration of the hypothesis that redistribution is not bad for growth.
The paper argues that more work is needed for the disentanglement of the
interplay of long-run economic fundamentals - like social fabrics, technology, his-
tory, institutions, or geography - and policy on the one hand, and policy and
growth on the other.
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A The capitalists’ optimum
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem (5) - (7) is given by
H = lnCkt + µt((r − τ)Kt − Ckt ). (A1)
The necessary first order conditions for its maximization are given by (6), (7) and
1
Ckt
− µt = 0 (A2a)
µ˙t = µtρ− µt (r − τ) (A2b)
lim
t→∞ Ktµte
−ρt = 0, (A2c)
where the positive co-state variable µt represents the instantaneous shadow price of
one more unit of investment at date t.
From (A2a) and (A2b) consumption grows at γ ≡ C˙kt
Ckt
= R − ρ where R ≡ (r − τ)
and constant. Thus, Ct = C0 e(R−ρ)t where C0 remains to be determined. Substituting
for Ct in (6) implies K˙t = R Kt − C0 e(R−ρ)t which is a first order, linear differential
equation in Kt and solved as follows
K˙t −R Kt = −C0 eγt
e−Rt
(
K˙t −R Kt
)
= −e−Rt C0 eγt∫
e−Rt
(
K˙t −R Kt
)
dt = −
∫
C0 e
−ρtdt.
The last equation is an exact differential equation with integrating factor e−Rt. The
LHS is solved by Kt e−Rt + b0 and the RHS is solved by C0ρ e
−ρt + b1, where b0, b1 are
arbitrary constants. Thus, Kt = C0ρ e
(R−ρ)t+ b eRt where b = b1− b0. Substituting this
into the transversality condition implies
1
C0
lim
t→∞
(
C0
ρ
e(R−ρ)t + b eRt
)
e−Rt = lim
t→∞
(
1
ρ
e−ρt +
b
C0
)
= 0
which holds if the arbitrary constant b is set equal to zero. Then Kt = C0ρ e
γt ⇒ γk =
γ = R − ρ so that consumption and wealth grow at the same constant rate in the
optimum. Furthermore, the optimal level of consumption at each date is given by
Ct = ρKt.
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B Welfare
The agents’ welfare is V (Cj) =
∫ t
0 lnC
j
t e
−ρt where j = k,W . Let t → ∞ and use
integration by parts. For this define v2 = lnC
j
t , and dv1 = e
−ρtdt. Recall dv2 =
˙
Cjt
Cjt
= γ
and constant. Then v1 = −1ρ e−ρt so that∫ ∞
0
lnCjt e
−ρt dt =
1
ρ
[
− lnCjt e−ρt
]∞
0
+
1
ρ
∫ ∞
0
γ e−ρt dt
=
lnCj0
ρ
− 1
ρ2
[
γ e−ρt
]∞
0
where Ck0 = ρK0 and C
W
0 = (η+ λτ)K0. Evaluation at the particular limits yields the
expressions in (9).
C Optimal Policies
The government solves: max
τ,λ
(1− β)V r + β V l s.t. λ ≥ 0 where β is the social weight
attached to the workers’ welfare. The FOCs are
β
ητ + λ
(η + λτ)ρ
+
γτ
ρ2
= 0 , λ
(
β
ηλ + τ
(η + λτ)ρ
+
γλ
ρ2
)
= 0.
Notice that γτ must be negative for the first equation to hold, so in the optimum τ > τˆ .
Concentrating on an interior solution for λ, simplifying, rearranging and division of the
resulting two equations by one another yields
ητ + λ
ηλ + τ
=
γτ
γλ
. (C1)
Then γλ = rλ and γτ = rτ−1 imply (ητ+λ)rλ = (ηλ+τ)(rτ−1) which upon multiplying
out becomes ητrλ+λrλ = rτηλ+ rττ −ηλ− τ. Notice rλητ = rτηλ and η = 1−αα r. Then
λrλ = rττ − 1−αα rλ − τ and so(
λ+
1− α
α
)
rλ = τrτ − τ ⇔
(
λ+
1− α
α
)
=
τrτ
rλ
− τ
rλ
.
Recall rτ = αE(1 − λ), rλ = αE(−τ) where E = (1 − α)A[(1 − λ)τ ]−α. Thus, τrτrλ =
− ταE(1−λ)αEτ = −(1− λ) and λ+ (1− λ) + 1−αα = − τrλ ⇔
rλ
α = −τ and so
τ =
[(1− α)A] 1α
1− λ . (C2)
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Notice that for this τ we have E = 1. For the first order condition for τ we note
that η = (1 − α)A[(1 − λ)τ ]1−α = E[(1 − λ)τ ] = [(1 − α)A] 1α . Furthermore, ητ =
(1− α)(1− λ), rτ = α(1− λ). Eqn. (C2) implies λ = 1− [(1−α)A]
1
α
τ so that
η + λτ = [(1− α)A] 1α + τ
(
1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
τ
)
= τ.
Then the first order condition for τ becomes
β
ητ + λ
(η + λτ)
= −γτ
ρ
⇔ ητ + λ
τ
= − γτ
βρ
⇔ ητ + λ
γτ
= − τ
βρ
.
But from above ητ+λγτ =
(1−α)(1−λ)+λ
α(1−λ)−1 = −1 so that τ = βρ. Thus,
τ = βρ and λ = 1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
βρ
. (C3)
which is equation (10) when β = 1. Recall that these equations hold for λ ≥ 0, thus
for βρ ≥ [(1− α)A] 1α .
Suppose λ = 0, then the first order condition becomes
ητ
η
= −rτ − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)E
τE
= −αE − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)βρ = τ − ατE
so that the solution with λ = 0 is given by
(1− α)βρ = τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] (C4)
which holds only if βρ < [(1− α)A] 1α . For β = 1 this is equation (11) in the text.
If β = 0, then τ = τˆ . Thus, the pro-capital policy maximizes growth.
D Reactions under Endogenous Policy
Pro-Capital. γˆ = α τˆ1−α − ρ and τˆ = [α(1 − α)A]
1
α . Clearly, dτˆdA > 0 and
dγˆ
dA > 0.
Furthermore,
dτˆ
dα
=
[α(1− α)A] 1α−1 (1− 2α)A
α
− [α(1− α)A]
1
α ln [α(1− α)A]
α2
=
τˆ (1− 2α)
α2(1− α) −
τˆ ln τˆ
α
(D1)
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which is not easy to evaluate. However, the following plot establishes that dτˆdα R 0 for
a particular level of A.
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Thus, for two different values of the share of capital one may have the same τˆ .
As dτˆdα R 0 the sign of
dγˆ
dα is not clear. For the calculation of
dγˆ
dα rearrange to get
(γˆ + ρ) = α τˆ1−α . Then
ln(γˆ + ρ) = lnα− ln(1− α) + ln τˆ
= lnα− ln(1− α) + ln(α(1− α)A)
α
=
(
α+ 1
α
)
lnα+
(
1− α
α
)
ln(1− α) +
(
1
α
)
lnA.
For the effect of a change in α on this expression one gets
d ln(γˆ + ρ)
dα
= −
(
1
α2
)
lnα+
(
α+ 1
α2
)
−
(
1
α2
)
ln(1− α)− 1
α
−
(
1
α2
)
lnA
=
1
α
[
1
α
−
(
1
α
)
ln(α(1− α)A)
]
=
1
α
[
1
α
− ln τˆ
]
.
As τˆ < 1 the expression is positive. Then d ln(γˆ+ρ)dα > 0 which implies
dγˆ
dα > 0.
Redistributing, Pro-Labour. By equation (10) τˇ = ρ so that dτˇdα = 0 =
dτˇ
dA . As
λ = 1− [(1−α)A]
1
α
ρ it follows that
dλ
dA < 0. Next, let c ≡ (1− α)A, then
dλ
dα
= −1
ρ
[
−Ac
1−α
α
α
− c
1
α ln c
α2
]
=
c
1
α
αρ
[
1
1− α +
ln(1− α) + lnA
α
]
.
Suppose A is low (e.g. A < e−
α
1−α ), then dλdα < 0. Next, suppose c ≈ 1, then dλdα > 0.
Thus, the sign of dλdα is ambiguous.
From equation (10) r = αA[(1− λ)τ ]1−α = α1−α [(1− α)A]
1
α so that dγˇdA > 0 under
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that policy. Furthermore, rearrangement yields
ln(γ + 2ρ) = lnα+
1− α
α
ln(1− α) + 1
α
lnA.
Taking the derivative yields
d ln(γ + 2ρ)
dα
=
1
α
− 1
α2
ln[(1− α)A]− (1− α)
α(1− α)
which is positive since (1− α)A = (1− λ)τ < 1 in (10). Hence, dγˇdα > 0.
Non-Redistributing, Pro-Labour. For λ = 0 the optimal tax rate τˇ solves
equation (11), that is, z = τ1−α − αAτ1−α − ρ = 0. The partial derivatives of z are
given by
zτ =
1
1− α − (1− α)αAτ
−α and zα =
τ
(1− α)2 −Aτ
1−α + αAτ1−α ln τ
with zτ being positive for all τ > τˆ . As zA < 0 it follows that dτˇdA = − zAzτ > 0 under
that policy. Furthermore,
dτ
dα
= −zα
zτ
= −
τ
(1−α) − (1− α)Aτ1−α + α(1− α)Aτ1−α ln τ
1− (1− α)2αAτ−α
=
τ
[
− 1(1−α) + (1− α)Aτ−α − α(1− α)Aτ−α ln τ
]
1− (1− α)2αAτ−α
where the first term in zα is positive, but the sum of the other two terms is negative.
However, τˇ ∈
(
(α(1− α)A) 1α , ((1− α)A) 1α
)
. Suppose τˇ → (α(1− α)A) 1α and A = 1.
Then the dτdα reduces to
τˆ (1− 2α)
α2(1− α) −
τˆ ln τˆ
α
which is the same expression as that for dτˆdα in (D1). Hence,
dτˇ
dα R 0.
For the growth rate one finds dγdA = rA + (rτ − 1) dτdA > 0 if
ατ1−α >
(
1− α(1− α)Aτ−α) [α(1− α)τ (τα − α(1− α)2A)−1]
τα − α2(1− α)2A > (1− α)τα − α2(1− α)2A
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which is equivalent to 1 > 1−α and true. Thus, dγˇdA > 0 if λ = 0 in (11). Furthermore,
dγˇ
dα
= Aτ1−α − dτ
dα
− αA [τ1−α ln τ]+ α(1− α)Aτ−α dτ
dα
= Aτ1−α − αA [τ1−α ln τ]− [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] dτ
dα
.
I want to show that dγˇdα > 0 for any τˇ ∈
(
(α(1− α)A) 1α , ((1− α)A) 1α
)
. For that it
suffices to show that dτdα < Aτ
1−α, since −αA [τ1−α ln τ] is non-negative. For the rest
of the proof it is convenient to represent the solution space τˇ in the form
τˇ = x ((1− α)A) 1α where x ∈
(
α
1
α , 1
)
⇔ τˇ ∈
(
(α(1− α)A) 1α , ((1− α)A) 1α
)
.
Higher x implies a higher optimal τˇ . I want to show that dτdα < Aτ
1−α, that is,
τ
(1−α) − (1− α)Aτ1−α + α(1− α)Aτ1−α ln τ
1− (1− α)2αAτ−α < Aτ
1−α
τα
A(1− α)2 − 1 + α ln τ <
1
1− α − α(1− α)Aτ
−α.
Substituting τˇ for τ yields
xα
1− α − 1 + α ln τˇ <
1
1− α −
α
xα
α
xα
− 1 + α ln τˇ < 1− x
α
1− α
and holds since α ln τˇ is unambiguously negative, αxα < 1 and x
α > 1 for all x ∈
(
α
1
α , 1
)
.
Hence, dγˇdα > 0.
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